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Abstract:  This article argues that whether we maintain that there is, or is not a causal link 
between teaching and learning has very important implications on both what we determine 
and how we identify as relevant, pertinent ethical considerations of responsibility and 
accountability for learners and teachers involved in the educational process. Much 
reflection on the relation between teaching and learning today, however, unfolds in the 
wake of the Humean critique of causality, denying any real causal link or ‗necessary 
connection‘ between teaching and learning. This article explains firstly the application of 
the Humean critique to the analysis of the relation of teaching and learning and elaborates 
on some implications of this way of looking at teaching and learning. Against this Humean 
way of understanding and analysing the relation of teaching and learning, the article argues 
for the view that there is a causal link between teaching and learning, but it stresses the 
complexity of that causality and the need for drawing a distinction between principal and 
instrumental-secondary causality, a distinction that is found in the writings of St Thomas 
Aquinas and elaborated by H. C. McCauley. The activities of teaching and learning do not, 
however, unfold outside of the society in which and of which they are an integral part. 
Thus the final section of this article provides an evaluation of the analysis of teaching and 
learning, raising some questions about the way power is organised in society and its critical 
role in understanding the relation between teaching and learning. 
 
 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The need for human beings to educate their young and each other throughout life is 
both a salient and a pervasive fact of human life, whether such education is 
conducted inside or outside of formal educational establishments, inside or outside 
the home, the classroom, the lecture-theatre, the playing field, the laboratory, the 
library, the church, the club and so forth. Each and every one of us are taught, from 
cradle to grave, to see things in certain ways, and education is extolled precisely for 
that very fact or dimension — that it teaches us to see things in certain ways. 
Perception, however sophisticated or simple it may be, is something that is taught. 
This is a fact of human experience. So, too, however, is the way we see the relation 
between teaching and learning — this, too, is something that is taught. Part of any 
discussion of education and its operation, then, is the way we perceive and 
understand (implicitly or explicitly) the relation between teaching and learning 
precisely because it is generally accepted and generally regarded that one of the main 
purposes in education is that the learner learns what is presented by the teacher for 
44 
 
the learner to know (however disputed the priority of the teacher‘s role in this 
process may be, and in whatever format such education takes place, and however 
ideologically driven, or hermeneutically configured, or economically motivated such 
educational activities and industry may be).  
We, both teachers and learners alike, all know from experience, however, 
that sometimes the teacher presents the material and the desired learning outcomes 
are not reached by the pupil. If teaching really did guarantee, or warrant successful 
learning, this could not and would not happen; as a matter of fact, alas, it does. 
Also, one can learn things for oneself, without being actually taught what one 
learns, without the aid of a teacher. In light of these considerations, it is tempting to 
conclude, as many critics of formal education do today, that there is no real, 
inherent causal link in the teaching and learning relationship between what a teacher 
does and what a pupil does where either the activity of teaching implies the activity 
of learning or the success of learning implies that one has been taught. What is 
more true to say of this relation, so it is argued, is that teaching and learning are 
essentially distinct and discreet and unrelated activities, each with their own 
respective and separate characteristic features, purposes and goals.1  
This way of looking at and approaching the nature of the activities of 
teaching and learning is, however, a relatively new view of the activities of teaching 
and learning in the history of the philosophy of education, gaining widespread 
support among certain philosophers of education in the middle-half of the 
twentieth century and eventually becoming known in the late 1960s as the ‗Standard 
Thesis‘ on teaching and learning.2 The central philosophical tenet supporting this 
‗Standard Thesis‘ on teaching and learning is that no matter how much one would 
like to believe that there is a causal link between what a teacher does and what a 
learner does, one will be hard-pressed to find, in reality, any discernible, or inherent, 
necessary connection between the activities of teaching and the activities of 
learning. This is the topic of this article, and its importance will be elaborated upon 
shortly, but one might be stalled from the outset for drawing any significant 
attention to this issue precisely because mention of the inability to find any 
‗necessary connection‘ between what a teacher in fact does and the effect that this 
has on a pupil‘s learning would not, of course, surprise many, in particular the 
 
1 For two well-known defences of this view, see, B. O. Smith, ‗A Concept of Teaching‘, in 
Philosophical Essays on Teaching, ed. by B. Bandman and R. S. Guttchen (New York: Lippincott, 1969),  
pp. 3–20 and T. F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971). See, also, 
Green‘s, ‗Topology of the Teaching Concept‘, in Bandman and Guttchen, eds, pp. 34–65. For these 
references and those in the following note, I am indebted to H. C. McCauley, ‗The Teaching–
Learning Relationship: A Thomist Perspective on the ―Standard Thesis‖‘, in Philosophy and Totality, 
ed. by James McEvoy (Belfast: Queen‘s University of Belfast, 1977), pp. 63–89.  
2 See, B. Paul Komisar, ‗Teaching: Act and Enterprise‘, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 6 (1967–68), 
168–193. The philosophers of education that expound the ‗Standard Thesis‘ mainly come from the 
analytic tradition in philosophy. For a defender of this approach, see, I. Scheffler, ed., Philosophy and 
Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2nd edn, 1966), p. 4, and S. Dinn, ‗Recent Trends in 
Educational Philosophy‘, Jewish Education, 37 (1967), p. 105. In addition to Smith, Green, and 
Schleffler well-known supporters are: P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, F. W. Mitchell, and B. S. Crittenden. 
See, McCauley, p. 87, n. 26. For a review of this topic and related issues, see, Paul Diels, ‗Teaching, 
Learning and Knowing‘, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 5 (1973), pp. 1–25. Not all analytic 
philosophers of education, of course, support this thesis, or support it completely, but, a 
considerable amount of them do, as McCauley notes. Komisar himself opposes it. See, McCauley, p. 
86, nos. 5, 13, 17. 
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followers of David Hume. According to Hume‘s famous critique, there is no 
necessary connection between a cause and its effect in any ‗matters of fact‘ that we 
may think are conjoined.3 Cashed into the analysis of the relation between what a 
teacher does and what a learner does, this means that there is no real, inherent, 
causal connection between teaching and learning, just as the ‗Standard Thesis‘ 
maintains. To corroborate this thesis, we can appeal to the empirical facts 
themselves, as intimated above, that one can teach, but the student does not learn, 
and that one can learn for one‘s self, and thus without being taught, through the 
application and industry of one‘s own inventiveness and intelligence.  
This way of understanding the causal link, or, perhaps more precisely stated, 
the missing causal link in the teaching-learning relationship, does have major 
implications and bearing on the evaluation process of what constitutes good 
teaching and good learning. For example, if this way of looking at teaching and 
learning is correct, then it makes perfect sense for both the providers and the 
assessors of educational practice to focus on teaching and learning as discreet 
activities. In contemporary parlance, we find this approach articulated in the 
directive of the Bologna Agreement (1999) (and its engine the Bologna Process)4 to 
those in charge of Universities within the European Union, to distinguish ‗teaching 
objectives‘ from ‗student learning outcomes‘, and to approach and evaluate the 
devising of syllabi and assessment procedures and the activities of teaching in terms 
of the ‗learning outcomes‘ of the student that are distinguishable as such, 
independently of teaching, and that are identifiable, definable, empirically analysable 
and achievable activities.5 Viewed in this light, the ethical exigency that impresses 
itself upon those in charge of the effective management of higher educational 
institutions is to secure the conditions best that befit, on the one hand, excellence in 
teaching and in research for teachers and, on the other hand, excellence in learning 
activities and in the achievability of learning outcomes for students. Such an 
approach, it is believed, will enable each of these activities of teaching and learning 
to progress simultaneously, and with the greatest degree of mobility across 
educational institutions in Europe, but, nonetheless, co-incidentally in the 
educational market-place. 
Examining and assessing the operations either of the teaching of a teacher 
or of the learning of a learner, as discrete activities in themselves with their own 
characteristic features, goals, and levels of success, is, of course, a legitimate 
educational concern, and important insights both into the nature of teaching and 
into the nature of learning may well be garnished in this way; this, however, should 
not obviate the point that this approach can only yield insight into certain features of 
teaching and of learning, not insight into the relation between teaching and learning.  
 
3 See, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section xiv Of the Idea of 
Necessary Connexion, ed. by L. A. Selbe-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888; 1967), pp. 155–172; first 
pub. in 1739. An on-line edited version by Jonathan Bennett of this classic text, that renders it more 
readable in contemporary English idiom while leaving in tact the main arguments, doctrines and lines 
of thought, is available from his excellent website: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/f_hume.html.  
4 See, http://www.bologna.ie. 
5 It is also a pivotal contention of this view that adopting a ‗student-centred‘ approach, one that is 
focused on learning outcomes and the competences that can be acquired in a defined workload of a 
student undertaking a programme of study, plays a key role in quality assurance of the learning 
process.  
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One major problem with this way of looking at both teaching and learning, 
therefore, is that it cannot account for or explain the relationship that actually does 
occur between teaching and learning precisely because this very relation is being 
evaded and not addressed by the holders of the ‗Standard Thesis‘. Maintaining that 
there is no metaphysical necessity operative in any alleged connectivity between the 
activities of teaching and of learning, whereupon teaching must produce learning in 
the learner is one thing, but it does not follow from this that there is no causal link 
of any sort between teaching and learning, or that teaching and learning are, in 
principle, distinct and essentially unrelated activities. If there is a causal link which 
‗the Standard Thesis‘ cannot account for between teaching and learning, and to 
which Hume‘s general critique of efficient causality does not apply, then those 
subscribing to the ‗Standard Thesis‘ may well find themselves deficient in their 
understanding of the precise nature and proper dimensions of the relation that 
really exists between teaching and learning. And misunderstanding the nature of the 
relation of teaching to learning and of learning to teaching metaphysically could 
have the baleful consequence for the assessors of such educational activity of mis-
construing and mis-identifying, or mis-targeting or applying inappropriately, or 
missing altogether ethical considerations relevant to the assessment of the 
responsibilities of both teacher(s) and learner(s) who are involved in the educational 
process (whether such is conducted at primary, post-primary or tertiary levels). In 
other words, the ‗Standard Thesis‘ may not be as reliable a guide and standard that 
it purports and promises to be, both in the understanding and in the ethical 
evaluation of the relationship that actually does exist between teaching and learning; 
or, at least, so shall I argue in the first part of this paper. 
Misunderstanding the nature of the relation of teaching and learning, 
nevertheless, does not call for a rejection of any further reflection on that relation. 
On the contrary, it calls for a proper understanding of the nature of that 
relationship. Yet the misunderstanding of the relation between teaching and 
learning has to be understood before a replacement can be sought and desired. 
Thus the first task of this paper is to draw attention to and outline, briefly, the 
philosophical support and significance of Hume‘s critique of the denial of any real, 
discernible causal link in any cause and its (alledged) effect on the way we look at 
the relation between teaching and learning that is implicit in the basis of the 
‗Standard Thesis‘.  
It is no doubt true to say that much reflection on the concept of causality 
today unfurls in the wake of a Humean-inspired critique of efficient causality, so 
this cannot be side-stepped. Against this way of understanding teaching and 
learning, however, that there is a causal link between teaching and learning will be 
put forward below (in section III), but it stresses the complexity of that causality 
and the need for a distinction between principal and instrumental-secondary 
causality, a distinction that is found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, and one 
that has been applied and worked-through in H. C. McCauley‘s article, ‗The 
Teaching-Learning Relationship: A Thomist Perspective on the ―Standard Thesis‖‗.6 
Since how we understand the nature of teaching and learning has a direct bearing 
on how we understand and identify the duties and responsibilities of both teacher 
and learner, this section also elaborates on some important ethical considerations in 
 
6 See, supra, n. 1. 
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McCauley‘s account, but which are omitted by those holding the ‗Standard Thesis‘. 
The activities of teaching and learning, of course, do not unfold outside of the 
society in which and of which they are an integral part. This holds whether the 
activities of teaching and learning are conducted formally or informally inside or 
outside classrooms or homes, lecture theatres or parks, churches or pubs. Thus the 
final section of this paper looks at and sketches an evaluation of the activities of 
teaching and learning in relation to some pertinent political questions regarding 
social existence underpinning the activities of teaching and learning, with particular 
reference to the way power is organised and its critical role in understanding the 
relation between teaching and learning.  
 
II 
THE LIMITS OF THE APPLICATION OF HUME‘S CRITIQUE OF  
EFFICIENT CAUSALITY TO THE TEACHING-LEARNING RELATIONSHIP 
 
Before Hume elaborated his critique of causality, the concept of causality had a 
noble, if not a venerable status in the history of philosophy. From its earliest 
beginnings in the ancient Greek-speaking world, thinkers sought for a principle that 
would explain the origin of the existence of the world by searching for an ultimate 
‗cause‘ of things that are. At first, they sought a material cause (Thales and the 
Ionian school), then a formal cause (Pythagoreans). Efficient and final causes were 
also somewhat distinguished by the pluralists (Empedocles and Anaxagoras). With 
Plato this search, remarkably, took a decidedly moral orientation. In light of his 
experiences of what had happened, unjustly, to his mentor Socrates, Plato sought 
‗the Good‘ that would explain that the way things are the way they ought to be. 
Thus Plato argued that in any organisation of matters pertaining to human 
relationships between each other and with each other and with anything that is, 
such matters are to be organised in the way they are with regard to the causal power 
of the form of the Good. An education in politics and the politics of education 
were never that far from an education in philosophy and the philosophy of 
education for someone like Plato.7 We could sum up Plato‘s view, then, by saying 
that in the exercise of practical reason justice without goodness is blind, goodness 
without justice, empty. 
This fundamental search for the cause of things that are and ought to be, 
however, came under sharp attack in the writings of Hume, but not, of course, 
without significant developments by other critics of the concept of cause before 
him.8 It is in the wake of that amiable Scot‘s demolition of the traditional concept of 
causality, nevertheless, that modern philosophers addressing the topic of the causal 
relationship between teaching and learning conduct their analyses and reflections. 
Thus it is of importance to understand Hume‘s general critique of efficient causality 
 
7  See, Plato‘s famous, Republic, written 360 B.C.E. 
8 For a most readable account of a host of central European ideas, including causality, and their 
development from their roots in Ancient Greece and the ancient Greek-speaking world, through the 
Middle ages and modern philosophy, up to and including their status in contemporary philosophy, 
see, Erik Lund, Mogens Pihl and Johannes Sløk, A History of European Ideas, trans. by W. Glenn Jones 
(London: Hurst, 1971). For a specific account of the changes to the concept and doctrine of 
causality in the modern period, see, Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 
1637–1739 (London: Routledge, 1999). 
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and the parts of that critique most relevant to the evaluation of the philosophical 
assumptions underpinning the ‗Standard Thesis‘ on teaching and learning. 
Hume pinned his colours to that tradition of philosophy which, in his eyes, 
made the most sense, namely, empiricism. Thus Hume held the conviction that all 
knowledge-claims, worth their salt, must be, in some sense, rooted in experience. 
While Hume never doubted that we can have knowledge of things that are 
necessarily true, such as, for instance, mathematical knowledge-claims (‗all triangles 
are three-sided figures‘) and logical-analytical knowledge-claims (‗all bachelors are 
unmarried men‘) such knowledge-claims, as Hume also pointed out, tell us 
absolutely nothing of significance about the real world. On the other hand, 
knowledge-claims pertaining to ‗matters of fact,‘ such as, for instance, I turned the 
key in the ignition of my car and the car started, do tell us something about the real 
world and are highly significant knowledge-claims about the real world. These 
knowledge-claims, however, are never necessarily true. I turn the key in the ignition 
of my car and this time, alas, the car, as a ‗matter of fact‘, does not start. That the 
car failed to start does not cancel the truth of my original belief that I turned the key 
and my car started before, nor does it cancel the truth of the fact that my car does 
not start because I know it is true that the car did not start; rather, this is simply the 
way such knowledge-claims pertaining to ‗matters fact‘ are. Matters of fact, when 
true, are never necessarily true. This is the way we come to know anything of real 
significance about the real world around us. 
When the initial understanding of the truth of the ‗matter of fact‘ that we 
originally held breaks down, explanation is called upon and steps in. ‗Why does the 
car that started a few hours ago not start now?‘ Perhaps I left the lights on, and the 
battery in my car is flat; or, perhaps, the ignition motor is faulty; or, maybe, the key 
has got damaged. Whatever the cause of my car not starting after I turn the key, my 
initial knowledge of starting the car with the key, derived as it is from experience, is 
simply not the kind of knowledge-claim that can be necessarily true in the way in 
which knowledge-claims such as ‗all triangles are three-sided figures‘ and ‗all 
bachelors are unmarried men‘, when true, are necessarily true (but insignificant). 
Perhaps an experienced car mechanic would know. And, then, perhaps that 
mechanic might not.  That mechanic, after all, has to go on that mechanic‘s 
experiences of ‗matters of fact‘, no differently to anyone of us non-experts in car 
mechanical maintenance. 
We do know, nevertheless, as Hume argues, why knowledge-claims that are 
necessarily true are true. They are analytically true. That is to say, if we know the 
meaning of the idea of ‗triangle‘ and of the idea of ‗a three-sided figure‘, then we 
know that it is necessarily true that ‗all triangles are three-sided figures‘. Likewise, if 
we know the meaning of the idea of ‗bachelor‘ and of ‗unmarried man‘, we know 
that it is necessarily true that ‗all bachelors are unmarried men‘, and so forth. Thus 
Hume concedes that we can and do have knowledge-claims that are both 
necessarily true and legitimate knowledge-claims concerning ‗relations of ideas‘ (as 
Hume calls them); such necessarily true, analytic knowledge-claims, however, 
cannot, as Hume also points out, tell us anything of significance about real world 
about us pertaining to ‗matters of fact‘. 
If we follow Hume, then we do know how to account for and to justify the 
epistemic status of knowledge-claims regarding ‗relation of ideas‘. Such knowledge-
claims are derived analytically from the ideas themselves and their logical meaning, 
no more, no less: the idea of bachelor implies the idea of an unmarried man, and 
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the idea of an unmarried man implies the idea of a bachelor. But how are we to 
account for and justify the arrival of our knowledge-claims pertaining to ‗matters of 
fact‘ that are never necessarily true, such as, for instance, my true belief in the car 
starting, when it starts, after I turn the key in the ignition? This is the kind of 
question that Hume himself raised, and the answer that he gave is as difficult to 
accept in its entirety as it is to refute in any of its aspects. 
According to Hume, the only way we can reasonably set about to address 
this question of how do we come to know the truth of anything pertaining to any 
‗matter of fact‘ is by adverting to and noting the way the human mind itself works.9  
And the way the human mind works, he notes, is by associating, over time and 
through experience, the idea of putting the key in the ignition of the car and the car 
starting. We link the two empirical ideas together in our mind (like seeing fires and 
smoke rising from them and then drawing the inference ‗there is no smoke without 
fire‘). Here, then, there is no necessary connection being affirmed at all about the 
key and the car starting, only a habitual, mental association of ideas, built up from 
sense-impressions and through our imagination, that are derived from experience 
over a succession of time.10 This is where our idea of cause and effect comes from. 
This is the way the mind actually works. This is a psychological fact of our mental 
life, if you wish. While such knowledge-claims of ‗cause and effect‘ from a 
psychological point of view are, therefore, unavoidable, such knowledge-claims from 
an epistemological point of view are, however, unjustifiable. We simply cannot claim 
to know that the car starts because I turned the key. There is nothing in my mental 
association of the ideas of putting the key into the ignition and the car starting over 
time that guarantees, or warrants, or necessitates that the car starts. I turn the key 
and, lo and behold, the car, as a matter of fact, does not start. And this holds for all 
knowledge-claims pertaining to each and any item of knowledge that is claimed to 
be true as a ‗matter of fact‘. No matter how many times we see fire followed by 
smoke, and see smoke and then fire, we cannot know (a priori) that there is ‗no 
smoke without fire‘ — we burn anthracite, there is fire and no smoke. From this, 
Hume drew the conclusion that there is no inherent necessity in things given to our 
sensible experiences to be causally connected in themselves in the way in which we 
assume they are, nor is there any inherent necessity in the way those things given to 
our experience are known by us (in the connections made by our imagination). And 
this we all know from experience and this is verifiable through and in reflections on 
 
9 In the ‗Introduction‘ to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes, ‗(T)here is no question of 
importance, whose decision is not compriz‘d in the science of man; and there is none, which can be 
decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore 
to explain the principles of human nature, we  in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, 
built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any 
security.‘ A Treatise, p. xx. Cf., the whole passage, pp. xix–xx. As one commentator rhetorically 
intimates, ‗(W)hat is this but a Scottish version of Kant‘s Copernican Revolution?‘ H. H. Price, 
Hume’s Theory of the External World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1st edn, 1940; 1967), p. 9. 
10 The role of ‗the imagination‘, over and beyond sense, both for the operations of memory as well as 
generating knowledge-claims about the external world, is, as Price argues, ‗even more fundamental in 
Hume‘s theory of knowledge than he himself admits‘ (p. 8.). Our understanding and valuation of the 
‗imagination‘ (‗imago’, ‘imaginatio’, ‗phantasia‘, ‗phantasmata‘), however, undergoes major development 
from Plato and the ancient Greeks, through medieval and modern thinkers, up to and including 
postmodern epochs, and thus contains several meanings. For the importance of imagination for 
both teacher and student, see Pádraig Hogan, The New Significance of Learning: Imagination’s Heartwork 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2010), esp. Ch. 5 ‗Opening Delphi‘, pp. 68–80. 
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the nature of our own human minds. All of this is rooted in experience. We all 
know that when we turn the key, and the car starts, we are delighted in the truth of 
this matter of fact; but we also all know that the next time we put the key in the 
ignition of a car, even in a new car, there is lurking in the back of one‘s mind the 
(implicit) knowledge that this car may not necessarily start when I turn the key. And 
if it does not start, we experience other emotions, such as, for instance, 
disappointment or frustration. And we might even project some of our views and 
feelings onto the car itself and declare ‗the stupid car won‘t start‘.11  
From the above considerations, important consequences for the traditional 
concept of cause, for Hume, follow. If there is no necessary connection with any 
alleged cause and its consequent effect (either objectively in nature or 
psychologically in the human mind‘s make-up), then there is no justification in 
asserting any inherent necessary connection in any of the activities that flow from 
any (allegedly) material, formal or final-purposeful causes that we think are 
discernible in the nature of things themselves, or that we think are discernible in the 
nature of relations between things themselves as we actually come to know them as 
‗matters of fact‘ (and as we assume, in truth, them to be) — thus the depth-
dimension of Hume‘s radical and devastating critique of the traditional concept of 
‗causality‘.12 
If we are taught by Hume to look at things in this manner, and I suggest 
that we are for perception is taught — indeed, Hume‘s teaching on this matter 
famously woke up Kant from his dogmatic slumber — and if we apply this way of 
looking at things to our experiences of the relation between teaching and learning, 
we can readily see the profound implications for the defence of any proponent of 
‗inherent connection‘ that appears to exist in terms of ‗cause and effect‘ in any 
relation between the activities of teaching and the activities of learning. There is 
none. There is no epistemic justification for any belief in any inherent connection 
between the activity of teaching and the activity of learning, however much we 
would like to think there is. And this is because there never was, nor ever will be any 
direct, necessary causal link between one ‗matter of fact‘ activity and the other 
‗matter of fact‘ activity that subsequently follows. 
If Hume is correct both in his account and in his general critique of cause 
and effect, then one would be hard-pressed to counter the supporters of the 
‗Standard Thesis‘ in their application of this celebrated critique to the activities of 
teaching and learning and to challenge, seriously, their followers‘ general position 
that these activities, as matters of fact, are better understood and evaluated as 
separate and discreet activities. 
 
11 ‗There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature to bestow on external objects the same 
emotions which it observes in itself; and to find everywhere those ideas which are most present to it. 
This inclination, ‗tis true, is suppressed by a little reflection, and only takes place in children, poets 
and the ancient philosophers. It appears in children by their desire of beating the stones, which hurt 
them: In poets, by their readiness to personify every thing: And in the ancient philosophers, by these 
fictions of sympathy and antipathy. We must pardon children because of their age; poets, because 
they profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy: But what excuse shall we find to 
justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness?‘ Hume, A Treatise, p. 224–225. 
12 In the section on ‗Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion‘, Hume is fully aware of these implications 
for ‗both ancient and modern [Cartesian-Lockean] philosophers‘ (ibid., p. 156) and for ‗that 
distinction, which we sometimes make [...] betwixt efficient causes, formal, and material, and 
exemplary, and final causes‘ (ibid., p. 171). 
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If Hume is incorrect, however, then it becomes incumbent on those 
educators who would like to argue for the position that there is some inherent, 
valuable and purposeful connection between what they do and the learner‘s 
learning, to refute, or at least, to challenge Hume‘s analysis and its dominant 
influence in monopolizing the way the relation between teaching and learning is 
approached in the ‗Standard Thesis‘ on teaching and learning.  
There are also, as noted above, ethical dimensions to this debate that need 
to be mentioned precisely because the way we understand, from a metaphysical 
point of view, the nature of the causal link (or the missing causal link) between 
teaching and learning has a direct bearing on how we identify, understand and 
evaluate relevant and pertinent expectations of responsibility and accountability for 
both learner(s) and teacher(s) in the educational process. Thus ‗the Standard Thesis‘ 
cannot go unchallenged for both metaphysical and ethical reasons, nor can it be 
uncritically adopted, however implicitly, either by those engaged in the practice of 
teaching or by those charged with the effective care of students and the careful 
management of the provision of education. 
There are several lines of attack that we could deploy to combat the claim 
expounded by the holders of the ‗Standard Thesis‘ that there is no necessary 
connection between teaching and learning. One way could be to point to the fact 
that the very experience of education itself, the experience of being taught, clearly 
makes some significant impact on the receivers of education — whatever the quality 
of the educational experience. In this instance, some inherent relation between 
teaching and learning must exist. Indeed, it is precisely because of this indubitable 
empirical matter of fact that John Dewey, one of the foremost and most influential 
philosophers of education of the twentieth century, called upon teachers of 
philosophy themselves to take more note of the educational dimensions of their 
work.13 No teacher of any subject, especially teachers of philosophy, so Dewey 
argued, should be remiss in their reflections on the link that does exist between 
what they teach and what the student learns and the significance of that educational 
experience (again, setting aside any evaluation of the quality of that experience). But 
where is this link to be found? How is this link established?  Pointing to the facts of 
experience and asserting that there is a link does not explain what that link is, or 
how that link is established. We can, after all, point to the fact that teaching can 
occur but the student does not learn. After Hume, we know where that link cannot 
be found. It cannot be posited in any inherent, objective metaphysical necessity 
anchoring together the activity of teaching and the activity of learning. Nor can this 
relation be posited as an a priori analytical truth concerning ‗the relation of ideas‘ 
that exists between ‗teaching and learning‘, without it becoming entirely 
insignificant, for, if it is logically the case that ‗teaching implies learning‘, such a view 
tells us nothing about the real world of teaching and learning. If there is a real 
connection between teaching and learning, then some other way of understanding 
the link between teaching and learning — which is not ascertained either through 
the logical analysis of the meaning of the ideas of ‗teaching‘ and ‗learning‘ or 
through the habitual, psychological-mental association of adventitious ideas arising 
from reflection on the activities of teaching and learning separately — has to be 
 
13 See, John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillian, repnt, 1961), p. 328; first pub. in 
1916. 
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found. And it has to be found and discernible in the nature of the experience and 
reality of the relation between teaching and learning itself. 
This, in effect, was what Dewey tried to do by appealing to the analogy: 
buying is to selling as teaching is to learning in order to draw attention to the 
intrinsic connectedness of the experience of teaching and learning, and this to be 
taken into consideration by teachers.14 Nothing can be bought, as a matter of fact, 
without something being sold. And if something is sold, then buying, as a matter of 
fact, has occurred. Similarly it can be surmised, no teaching has occurred unless 
some learning has occurred in a teaching–learning experience, and correlatively, no 
learning has occurred unless some teaching had occurred in a teaching–learning 
relationship.15 Teaching implies learning and learning implies teaching, not as a 
logical necessity, but in an analogous fashion to the way in which buying implies 
selling and selling implies buying in the exchange between seller and buyer.16 While 
this view has the merit of not making the teaching of a teacher so metaphysically 
constituted as to cause learning in the learner‘s learning — teaching and learning are 
taken as different activities with each having its own separate integrity but 
necessarily co-existing analogous to buying and selling — this analogy, alas, breaks 
down in light of the facts of teaching and learning. Sometimes the teacher presents 
material (sells) and the learner does not learn successfully (buy). And the learner can 
learn things through the application and exercise of one‘s own intelligence and 
initiative (buys), without being taught (being sold) what one learns. Thus the 
analogy buying is to selling as teaching is to learning must ignore (or rationalize) the 
reality of the fact that one can teach and the learner fails to learn. And if it ignores 
this fact, this view is ignoring the reality of the kind of relation that does exist 
between the activities of teaching and the activities of learning. 
 
14 ‗Teaching may be compared to selling commodities. No one can sell unless someone buys. We 
should ridicule a merchant who said that he sold many goods although no one had bought any. But 
perhaps there are teachers who think that they have done a good day‘s teaching irrespective of what 
pupils have learned. There is the same exact equation between teaching and learning that there is 
between selling and buying.‘ John Dewey, How We Think (New York: D.C. Heath, 1933), pp. 35–36. 
This comparison was similarly expressed by William Heard Kilpatrick, one of the central figures in 
educational thought in the early 1930s besides Dewey, when he remarks that just as ‗(T)he salesman 
hasn‘t sold unless the customer buys. [So, too,] The teacher hasn‘t taught unless the child learns. I 
believe in the proportion: teaching : learning : : selling : buying.‘ W. H. Kilpatrick, Foundations of 
Education (New York: Macmillan, 1935), p. 268. Cited in McCauley, p. 66. 
15 ‗Put briefly the Dewey-Kilpatrick view‘, then, ‗states: ―Teaching implies learning‖.‘ McCauley, p. 
66. 
16 There are, of course, other analogies, or models, or proportionalities, or images that maybe more 
suited to understanding the teaching–learning relationship than buying and selling. For instance, if 
we wish to draw attention to the generosity of a teacher in the teaching–learning relationship, we 
may be better disposed to looking at this dimension analogously to close, parent–child relationship. 
‗Think of the intimacy of family relations: when the parent gives to the child, one is not diminished 
as the other is augmented; the giving of the one diminishes not the giver as it augments the receiver. 
Consider the relation of teacher and learner: the one who knows is not diminished by passing on 
knowledge to one who does not know; knowing is a reserve of richness that is not diminished or 
spent in being given over to another; the generous sharing of knowing is intimate to the brimming 
actuality of knowing itself.‘ William Desmond, God and the Between (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 314. 
We stand on the shoulders of those who went before us, and this is as true of formal educational 
advancement as it is of informal educational information, but sometimes it takes a generosity of 
spirit to see such. There is more than one way at looking at ‗exchange‘ between individuals (and 
societies) than the one modelled on ‗buying and selling‘. 
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To overcome the above problems, we could make this ‗analogy‘ normatively 
true, that is to say, we could maintain that teaching does not, as a matter of fact, 
necessarily imply learning but it should imply learning. Thus it is only on the basis of 
successful achievement of the learning outcomes by the student(s) that a teacher, 
subsequently, should be considered, really, a teacher. Only when the learner learns 
what is taught is the teacher really a teacher, or should be called a teacher. Built into 
this view, therefore, is ‗the notion of learning‘ as ‗a defining characteristic of the 
notion of teaching, and the occurrence of the former is a sine qua non of the latter.‘17 
This view, nevertheless, has several difficulties, and if seriously entertained, does 
lead to somewhat bizarre conclusions. Firstly, as McCauley points out, ‗must we wait 
until after testing the pupils before describing ourselves as having been teaching?‘18 
Likewise, ‗how are we to account for the situation where a teacher takes a class of 
ten for the Ablative Absolute and discovers only eight have learned? Are we to say 
he was teaching boys 1–8, but not boys 9 and 10? Are we to say he was both 
teaching and not teaching at the same time?‘19  And if a teacher attempted to teach 
‗the Ablative Absolute‘ and no student in the class actually managed to learn it, are 
we to conclude that the teacher was not (really) teaching at all?20  If one seriously 
believed that teaching should imply learning and that learning proves that teaching 
actually occurred, then a teacher really should be remunerated and assessed not in 
respect of carrying out duties and responsibilities associated with the profession of 
teaching but in relation to the quota of grades directly produced by that teacher in 
his or her students.21  And if this were seriously believed by those who are actually 
employed in the educational profession (whether at first, second, third or fourth 
level), most of those employed would probably arrive home with little wage-packets 
in their pockets, or give back most of their salaries to their respective employers. 
Thus we can readily concur with Green‘s remarks (in 1954) that: ‗Many educators 
rather glibly pronounce the dictum ―if there is no learning there is no teaching‖. But 
this is only a way of speaking, because no educator really believes it to be true or he 
would in all honesty refuse to take most of his salary.‘22 
Such dictums or slogans as ‗There is no teaching when there is no learning‘, 
or ‗If there is no learning there is no teaching‘ are, nonetheless, attractive to those 
who wish to have, as McCauley puts it, ‗a neat formula for judging teacher 
performance and certification.‘23 Yet, to make the learning of the pupil a defining 
characteristic of teaching is not only simply unrealistic but it also obscures a proper 
understanding of both the reality and the experience that teachers and pupils have 
of any teaching and learning relationship. Sometimes teachers teach and the 
students simply do not learn or learn as well as expected. Given the fact that 
teaching does not necessarily imply learning, and that the lack of success on the part 
 
17 McCauley, p. 66. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For the supporter‘s of the ‗Standard Thesis‘, ‗it makes no sense to say if a student has not learned, 
the teacher has not taught.‘ B. O. Smith, ‗On the Anatomy of Teaching‘, in Readings in the Philosophy of 
Education, ed. by J. M. Rich (Belmount, California: Wadsworth, 1966) pp. 331–340 (p. 332). 
Originally published in The Journal of Teacher Education, 7 (1956) 339–346. Cited in McCauley, p. 66.  
21  
22 H. S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 14. Cited in 
McCauley, p. 66. 
23 McCauley, p. 66. 
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of the learner should not be a defining element in the task of teaching, the best way 
to approach this relation, so it is concluded, is to maintain that teaching and 
learning are, in effect, really separate and discrete activities; and so, one falls back 
onto the ‗Standard Thesis‘ as the only realistic option available. Thus the necessity 
now follows to separate and specify the appropriate tasks of teaching and of 
learning. See how people learn and see how people teach. Then generalize from 
that. Develop teaching skills and research skills among teachers and develop 
learning skills and achievable learning outcomes for learners by promoting among 
teachers imitation of the best practice in teaching skills and among learners 
imitation of best practice in learning skills. Teachers and learners should each be 
expected to get on with their respective tasks that they can do and for which they 
can be held accountable and assessed. Teachers and their research objectives can be 
tallied and assessed. Learners and their learning outcomes can be tallied and 
assessed too. In this regard, we are not subscribing to any spurious, metaphysical 
understanding of any allegedly ‗causal link‘ or ‗necessary connection‘ between 
teaching and learning, nor are we exposing both teacher(s) and pupil(s) to 
unrealistic expectations or to unfulfillable commitments in a teaching-learning 
relationship. Thus the ‗Standard Thesis‘ gives us not only a better understanding of 
teaching and learning but it also supports the best evaluative model for best 
teaching practice and best learning practice.24 
While this focus undoubtedly draws attention to the fact that teaching and 
learning are distinct activities, and that each have their own integrities, this way of 
analyzing the teaching-learning relation evades, nevertheless, the very issue that it is 
to suppose to throw light on, namely, the actual relation and the mode of contact 
between the activities of teaching and learning.25 And by evading this issue it evades, 
alas, the question of the proper responsibilities of both teacher(s) and learner(s) in 
that relation because ‗(U)ltimately‘, as Green points out, and this is the nub of the 
matter, ‗a correct understanding of the connection between teaching and learning is 
crucial because without it we cannot know how, within the institutions of 
education, we are to understand the office of the teacher and to what extent 
 
24 There is growing unease regarding the criteria of ‗evaluation‘ (as is called British English) or 
‗assessment‘ (as is called in American English) and the ‗key performance indicators‘, which include 
such things as ‗impact‘ of research, that are being devised and used to judge the quality of teaching in 
third-level institutions. See, the recently published report by the Research Information Network 
(http://www.rin.ac.uk/), ‗Communicating Knowledge: How and Why UK Researchers Publish and 
Disseminate their Findings‘, available on-line from the Joint Information Systems Committe (JISC) 
at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/publications/documents/communicatingknowledgereport.aspx. This 
unease is part of wider concerns pertaining to the entire issue of the assessment/ evaluation of both 
students and teachers at all levels of education and, in particular, at the assumptions concerning the 
relation between teaching and learning upon which such assessment/ evaluation is based. Indicative 
of this is the recent ‗Call for Papers‘ from the  Journal of Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis for 
their next volume 30, 2010, at Viterbo University, on: ‗Theme: Exploring the Philosophical 
Assumptions of Assessment Culture in Education‘, http://www.viterbo.edu/atpp/. The issue of 
evaluating the performance of Universities is also being addressed in Irish Universities. See, the 
recent report (March, 2009) from the Royal Irish Academy, ‗Developing Key Performance 
Indicators for the Humanities‘, available from their website under ‗Current Initiatives‘, 
(http://www.ria.ie/policy/pdfs/humanities.pdf.) and the difficulty with having ‗impact‘ as a criterion 
in particular for the Humanities. Documents dealing with the evaluation of research performance in 
Economics and Social Sciences and in other areas of the Universities are also available here. 
25 McCauley, p. 75. 
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teachers can be held accountable for the results of their efforts‘.26 An alternative 
way of understanding the relation between teaching and learning that does not 
impale itself on either horn of the dilemma — that there is no real point of 
connection between what the teacher does and what the learner does (as advocated 
in the ‗Standard Thesis‘) and its opponent‘s view that a student‘s learning is a 
defining characteristic of a teacher‘s teaching — is needed. This is ‗crucial‘, as 
Green professes, even if his analysis evades this very issue itself; but, it is crucial not 
only for the purposes of determining the teacher‘s accountabilities, it is also crucial 
for determining the responsibilities for both the teacher and the learner in the 
educational process. Green himself does not supply any such account.27  It is against 
the background of this lack in the latter‘s analysis of the relation between teaching 
and learning, then, that McCauley turns to St Thomas and to his followers who 
operate with a much wider and more complex notion of causality that is better 
equipped and suited to explaining, in the author‘s view, the precise nature of the 
link and mode of contact between teacher and pupil in the teaching and learning 
relationship and the apportioned share of responsibilities of each.28 
 
III 
THE RELATION BETWEEN TEACHING AND LEARNING REVISITED: 
A THOMIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
Whatever disagreements among both opponents and proponents of the ‗Standard 
Thesis‘ regarding the efficient causality, or the lack of efficient causality that is 
(allegedly) operative between what a teacher does and what a pupil learns, holders 
of the ‗Standard Thesis‘ agree with their critics on at least one fundamental point 
that an important goal of education is that the learner learns what is presented by 
the teacher for the learner to know. What supporters of this thesis fail to do, 
however, is to give an adequate account of this relation. In order to tackle this issue, 
we need to take into consideration three distinct but related questions, namely: (1) 
what is learning, (2) what is teaching?, and (3) how exactly is the activity of learning 
related to the activity of teaching?  These are the three main questions that 
McCauley sets out to address in his article ‗The Teaching-Learning Relationship: A 
Thomist Perspective on the ―Standard Thesis‖‘. His answer to the third question is 
of most relevance to our concerns, but we must briefly address the first two 
questions, as the answer to the third question depends, to a significant degree, on 
what we understand by ‗learning‘ and ‗teaching‘. 
Turning to the first question, then, what is learning?  In many respects, it is 
difficult to give a precise definition of what learning is because so many different 
types of learning and different kinds of learning have to be accomplished by each 
and any one of us, from the cradle to the grave.29 Learning to walk is quite different 
 
26 Green, The Activities of Teaching, p. 144, cited by McCauley, p. 71. 
27 This can be put down to Green‘s ‗restricted view of causation‘ (McCauley, p. 75). St Thomas 
operates with a much richer and complex notion of causality than the one that Hume and post-
Humean philosophers attend to, hence the significance of retrieving this particular understanding for 
advancing understanding of the connection between teaching and learning in McCauley‘s approach. 
28 See, McCauley, esp. Section IV, pp. 75–84. 
29 And if, as Aristotle famously remarked, ‗what we have to learn to do, we learn by doing‘, then 
learning cannot be really defined in abstraction from and without regard to the particular practises 
undertaken.  
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from learning to play the piano, which is quite different from learning a 
mathematical formula in physics, such as, E=MC2, which is quite different from 
learning to interpret a law or a play or the significance of an experience. Learning 
and its related concepts (e.g., knowing, understanding, etc.) are thus better 
approached and better understood as analogous terms rather than as terms with 
fixed univocal or equivocal meanings (as the supporters of St Thomas maintain).30 
That learning evolves around a hard core of meaning pertaining to ‗coming to know 
something‘ whatever it is that one learns and however one learns, learning is a 
process of coming to know something that one did not know already. One cannot 
learn something that one already knows. It is thus a defining feature of learning that 
it involves, as St Thomas stresses, discovery (inventio).31 Learning is a gaining of 
knowledge by discovery. Using Gilbert Ryle‘s distinction between ‗task‘ and 
‗achievement‘, we can say, with the analytic philosophers and McCauley, that 
learning is an ‗achievement‘.32 In learning, we accomplish something successfully. 
We cannot be said to have unsuccessfully learned something. We can, of course, not 
learn something completely, or achieve partial success in learning something. 
Achievements (such as learning), therefore, are subject so some form of gradation. 
There will be grades of achievement by the learner in the learning of what is 
presented by the teacher for the learner to know.33 And this, as any teacher or 
student knows, is both to be expected and to be factored into the assessment of a 
learner‘s work. 
What is teaching? This is the second question that needs to be addressed. 
Teaching is an activity that involves the presentation of a subject-matter or a body 
of knowledge to be grasped/ known by the learner. In this regard, teaching is clearly 
a purposive activity, or, perhaps, it can be more precisely defined as an intentional 
serial performance conducted by a person (a teacher) or persons (teachers) aimed at 
eliciting an appropriate learning response in those to whom it is directed.34 
Teaching, in other words, is a ‗task‘, and it involves a process of doing things over 
time that may, or may not be completed successfully. And it may be performed 
well, or badly. I can come out of a class and say, ‗I really did not teach that well‘, or, 
‗I taught that much better this year than I did last year‘. Unlike ‗achievement‘ that is 
necessarily associated with ‗learning‘ and its goal, ‗achievement‘ is not necessarily 
associated with ‗teaching‘ and its goal. Though a sense of achievement is clearly of 
importance both to learner and to teacher alike, we can teach, nevertheless, and the 
student does not learn, but this does not imply that we were not teaching. Nor does 
it necessarily imply that we were teaching badly, just that the learner did not achieve 
his or her results (learning outcomes). While we can thus separate learning and 
teaching in noting that whereas learning is an ‗achievement‘ and teaching is a ‗task‘, 
 
30 See, T. Guzie, The Analogy of Learning (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960). For a general account of 
analogy in the writings of St Thomas, see, Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St 
Thomas (Nijhoff: Hague, 1961). 
31 Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. XI, a. lc., cited by McCauley, p. 89, n. 75. We can come upon (in-venire) 
such knowledge either by ourselves or through the teaching (disciplina) of others. See, Fainche Ryan‘s 
article in this collection, ‗Teaching to Think: St Thomas as Pedagogue‘, pp. 93–105, esp., p. 98–99. 
32 See, McCauley, pp. 68–71. 
33 This is accounted for by act and potency as co-determining metaphysical principles applicable to 
each and any individual knower. See, infra, n. 36. 
34 This definition was given to me by Harry McCauley in a conversation that we had about teaching 
and learning a few years ago, in his office at NUI Maynooth. 
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there is still a common goal or link in this process between teaching and learning, 
namely, ‗knowledge‘. In the learner‘s case it is the acquisition of knowledge. In the 
teacher‘s case, it is the presentation of knowledge. Since knowledge is the link, this 
necessitates addressing two broader questions: what is knowledge and how is knowledge 
possible? 
Both of these questions have been raised and answered differently down 
through the ages and throughout the history of philosophy, from ancient Greek 
times to medieval, through modern and up to and including contemporary epochs. 
Though it is true to say that epistemology has taken central stage in modern 
philosophy with Descartes, Hume and Kant, this does not imply that there are 
many epistemological insights to be found in respective philosophers of other 
philosophical epochs. Augustine and Aquinas, for example, have many important 
insights in epistemological matters, as do the early Greek and Roman stoic 
philosophers. It is outside the limits of this paper to address such epistemological 
matters, but, as McCauley summarily remarks, from an Aristotelian-Thomistic point 
of view, two things are necessary for anything to be known and for knowledge to be 
possible, namely: (1) the power of knowing and (2) something to be known 
(something potentially intelligible).35 Again, the power of knowing, from an 
Aristotelian-Thomistic point of view, is ultimately co-determined by the 
metaphysical principles of act and potency in an individual knower-learner.36 
Furthermore, the something that is to be known follows upon a realist conception 
of knowledge where the knower‘s first reality is not the knower‘s own operations. 
This latter conception characterizes the starting-point of what we could call 
modern, psycho-analytic theories of knowledge (inaugurated by Descartes and 
advanced by Locke, Hume, and Kant). By comparison to this psychological 
starting-point, contact with that which resides outside of the knower‘s mind, 
whether that be physical things around us, artefacts, nature understood from a 
teleological point of view, or the presence of one‘s own fellow human being, is, for 
Aristotle and Aquinas, their starting point.37 These general, realist metaphysical and 
epistemological assumptions, then, direct (however tacitly or explicitly) reflection on 
 
35 McCauley, p. 79 
36 This is also why, as McCauley notes, ‗(T)he teacher‘s exclusion from direct control of another‘s 
learning is, thus, ultimately rooted in the ramifications of the metaphysics of potency and act‘ (p. 89).  
See, also, Hogan, for a similar point: ‗This means that the relationships of teacher and student are, in 
principle, less hierarchical than those of [expert] master and disciple. [...] Rather, the student [in a 
teaching–learning relationship] is acknowledged as a new participant in the venture of learning, 
whose pathway will in many ways be similar to that of fellow students, but will be hopefully marked 
by turns and achievements that are particular to the student‘s own range of promise‘ (pp. 74–75). 
One still has to exercise critical judgement regarding which ‗potencies‘ or ‗range of promise‘ of an 
individual that is to be ‗realised‘. For a critical perspective on talk about the function of education to 
realise ‗the potential‘ of students, see Richard Pring‘s article in this volume, ‗What Counts as an 
Educated 19 Year Old?‘, pp. 74–82, especially his Section II ‗The Language of Education‘. 
37 Thus central problematics may figure in one historical epoch but not the other. For instance, the 
question of bridging the gap between my consciousness and the external world does not and cannot 
feature in Scholastic Aristotelian-Thomistic Medieval philosophy since sense knowledge of external 
things is dependent on acts of sensation and sensory contact with external things. (Aristotle, in fact, 
deploys this as an argument for the corporeality of the sensitive soul in the human being.) 
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both the activities of teaching and the activities of learning and the relation between 
teachers and learners for St Thomas and for his followers.38 
Bearing the abovementioned realist, metaphysical and epistemological 
assumptions in mind, this brings us to the third and crucial question addressed in 
McCauley‘s article, namely: what role does teaching play in this acquisition of 
knowledge that is characteristic of learning? McCauley argues that since teaching is 
what presents the subject-matter to be known, and since the student is open to 
receive that intelligible subject-matter, the activity of teaching is primarily 
instrumental in the learning process.39  The goal of teaching is that the learner comes 
to know what the learner set out to know. Thus the activity of teaching is sub-
ordinate to the activity of learning. The final goal of teaching and learning is that the 
learner learns for him and her self.40 The responsibility of learning remains within 
the learner and the responsibility of teaching remains within the teacher, but the 
causal relationship between teaching and learning is a complex one. It is not one of 
direct efficient causation, that is to say, the view that the teacher, through teaching, 
either implies or produces learning in the learner; rather, the teaching-learning 
relationship concerns both principal and instrumental-secondary causation working 
together for the end of the process which is the learner‘s achievement (the final 
cause). In this account of the teaching–learning relationship, both teacher(s) and 
learner(s) retain their ontological distance and integrities as to whom each of them 
are in that relation. In this account both teacher and learner also retain their specific 
responsibilities and agencies. The agency of the teacher and the agency of the 
learner are thus both respected, but they are respected as distinct and related 
agencies. And since whatever we have responsibility for is a matter of morality, 
herein, respective responsibilities for both teacher and learner can be therein 
identified and apportioned. 
In the agency of the teacher, ‗a teaching intention‘ is not just ‗a bare 
intention‘ to teach the students, but ‗extends to selection of appropriate materials 
and formats‘.41 The selection of appropriate materials and formats, of course, also 
need to take into account the appropriate levels of understanding desired and the 
point of development of the knowledge of students. This selection of appropriate 
material and formats to the level of understanding desired, nevertheless, are both 
defining and limiting (material-causal) factors in the process of the students‘ 
learning or knowing; that is to say, the material presented and the way in which the 
material is presented to the learner are essential ingredients of what it is that is learnt 
 
38 However critical followers of St Thomas‘s own particular views on teaching and learning may be, 
they still unfold their reflections from within such a realist metaphysical perspective. See, Simon F. 
Nolan, ‗Teaching and Learning in the Summa theologiae of Gerard of Bologna (d. 1317)‘, in Maynooth 
Philosophical Papers Issue 5 (2008), ed. by Nolan (Maynooth: Department of Philosophy, NUI 
Maynooth, 2009), pp. 35–41 (published on-line at: http://philosophy.nuim.ie/publications.shtml).  
39 This understanding is based upon an understanding of the Thomistic notion of instrumental cause. 
See the detailed and meticulous treatment of this concept by J. S. Albertson, ‗Instrumental Causality 
in St Thomas‘, The New Scholasticism, 28 (1954), 409–435. 
40 See, J. W. Donohue, St Thomas Aquinas and Education (New York: Random, 1968). See also, supra, 
n. 31. 
41 McCauley, p. 87, n. 38. Thus ‗understanding‘ is essentially an analogous term related to such other 
analogous terms as ‗learning‘ and ‗knowing‘. Thus what is meant by ‗understanding‘ in learning-
outcomes, whether designed for primary school, second school or third and fourth level education 
cannot be univocally or equivocally determined without distortion of what is involved in 
‗understanding‘ at all of these levels. 
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by the learner in the knowing process of the learner(s) in such a teaching-learning 
relation. Within the control of teacher, then, is the ‗disposing, ordering and 
multiplying examples for the benefit of the learner‘.42  Note, here, that when the 
deliberate intention of the teacher(s) is to not select, or not to provide material for 
knowledge to be learned, the question of indoctrination arises.43 In order to teach, 
the teacher needs to be both open to and balanced in the selection and the 
researching of material for students; otherwise, there is a real danger of engaging in 
a process of indoctrination instead of education.44 And indoctrination, from an 
educational point of view, is not only poor teaching practice, it is also morally 
questionable.45  There is, in other words, an ethical exigency (as Plato had noted) 
both in the acquisition of knowledge that is presented by the educator and in the 
presentation of the knowledge-content by the educator to the student to be learned, 
but the method of teaching itself, whatever the content, is ‗an art, and not a 
science‘.46 In this regard, ‗the [good-skilful] teacher adapts his activity to the natural 
dynamism of discovery learning, seeking to aid and specify that natural activity [of 
the learner]‘.47  Thus the teacher ‗co-operates with and depends on co-operation 
from the pupil‘.48 All of this is done, on part of both the teacher and the learner, 
from within a vision of the ‗common good‘ of teaching and learning. The common 
good, of course, is a moral concept, and so, subject to moral evaluation, but this is 
precisely why both teacher and pupil need to engage jointly in the evaluation of that 
‗common good‘ of teaching and learning. Viewed in this light, the teaching and 
learning relationship is something that is not the exclusive property of either teacher 
or learner but a shareable reality between the parties that is brought into existence 
through their co-operation, and only exists therein.49 If, for instance, a student steals 
a book from the library which the teacher has provided in the library for students 
from which to learn, then this affects, detrimentally, the common good of both 
teaching and learning. And if the teacher withdraws a book from the library (or fails 
to provide that source through culpable negligence) so as students will not be 
 
42 McCauley, p. 83. 
43 If the teacher is aware of this short-coming in his presentation of his material for the student to 
learn, and does nothing about such culpable negligence, then there is, as McCauley notes, very little 
difference between such ‗faulty teaching‘ and ‗indoctrination‘ (p. 89, n. 80). 
44 Research undertaken for the purposes of teaching, then, is far from being an added luxury of a 
teacher because teaching implies research. Such research for teaching purposes is essential to (good) 
teaching practice. Research, of course, can be conducted for other purposes that are not directly 
related to what one teaches or to the purpose of educating others (either directly or indirectly).  
45 The question of indoctrination often arises in conjunction with the teaching of religion, though it 
certainly is not confined to issues of religious education. 
46 McCauley, p. 84. 
47 Ibid., p. 82. 
48 Ibid. 
49 This is why, as Hogan remarks, ‗healthy relationships of learning are not something that can be 
made at will by the teacher. They are a joint achievement requiring, to be sure, diverse qualities of 
originality [and imagination] in the teacher, but requiring also a response-in-kind [of originality and 
imagination] from students‘ (The New Significance of Learning, p. 77). He does remark, however, that 
‗close attention to these responses, and to building productively on them, is one of the most 
neglected aspects of the study of teaching‘ and that ‗such responses can originate something as yet 
unthought of, and take learning on paths which neither teacher nor students had previously 
envisaged‘ (p. 77–78). Focus on identifying and stipulating in advance ‗learning outcomes‘ would 
appear, therefore, to overlook, again, this essential dimension of healthy teaching and learning 
relationships. 
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exposed to it, then this, too, is equally detrimental to ‗the common good‘ of 
teaching and learning.50 
Turning to the agency of learning, from an Aristotelian-Thomistic point of 
view the exercise of an individual‘s abstractive powers of knowledge on what is 
presented by the teacher is the responsibility of the student. This, of course, 
presupposes that the ‗learner is open to outside influence [and predisposed to 
receiving such information]‘.51 And it is ‗through this opening that the activity of 
teaching intervenes in the learner‘s activity‘.52 
Within this intervention, then, ‗(I)n learning the pupil is moving from image 
to image, from insight to insight, from judgement to judgement, in an ever growing 
complexity […] [reaching] the act of knowledge, which is […] the term of  learning, 
its goal.‘53 Thus it follows that if a ‗student is lazy or ill, or merely inattentive and 
inclined to day-dream, then his or her eliciting of agent acts i.e. his active 
participation in learning, will be greatly diminished.‘54 In this regard, as McCauley 
acutely argues, ‗(T)he pupil remains the principal cause of his or her learning, and 
ultimately the teacher‘s action is intelligible only in conjunction with, and in 
subordination to, that of the pupil.‘55 
And if the teacher is lazy, or inattentive and ill-prepared for his class, he is 
responsible for that, and that also diminishes the common good of teaching and 
learning.56 All of this is another way of saying and of acknowledging that teaching 
and learning are inter-dependent activities each with their own respective, 
apportioned responsibilities and agencies, and not separate and discrete activities 
co-incidentally arsing in the educational market-place as promoted by ‗the Standard 
Thesis‘. The teacher and teacher‘s activities are instrumental in the student‘s 
learning. Viewed in this way, ‗the teacher is viewed neither as manufacturer nor as 
impotent bystander, but is restored to his proper place in the educational enterprise 
as guide and director of his pupil‘s learning‘.57 And this account not only leads to 
the possibility of gaining a better understanding of the relation that exists between 
teaching and learning but it also provides the possibility of gaining a better point of 
application for evaluating both the activities of teaching and of learning wherein the 
duties and responsibilities of the teacher qua instrumental secondary cause in 
 
50 Thus the teacher is also bound, both practically and ethically, to learning by discovery in that 
individual‘s own research activities for teaching purposes. One can, of course, undertake research 
and engage in research activities that are not connected to teaching purposes. See, supra, n. 44. 
51 McCauley, p. 81. Not all pupils in a classroom or all students in a lecture hall are equally pre-
disposed to receiving such information dispensed by teachers. This is why support services outside 
of the classroom and lecture hall are indispensable to the unfolding of the ‗common good‘ of 
teaching and learning, and their constant improvement an ethical exigency for the providers of 
education. Unlike business that can select the best products and sell on only the best products, 
teachers have to bring along mixed abilities to the best of those abilities where outside social factors 
are brought into the classroom and lecture theatre too. See Pring‘s remarks on the entrepreneur that 
produced an excellent business in ‗blueberries‘, and the inadequacy and distortion of applying such a 
model to education, in Section III ‗Are Schools Businesses‘ of his paper in this collection, ‗What 
Counts as an Educated Nineteen Year Old?‘. 
52 McCauley, p. 81. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 83. 
55 Ibid., p. 82. 
56 See, Hogan, p. 79. 
57 McCauley, p. 83. 
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specifying what knowledge is to be learned, its presentation, ordering and delivery 
to students, as well as a student‘s principle responsibilities for her own acts of 
learning, are both respected. From within this realist, Thomist perspective, 
therefore, teaching objectives and learning outcomes cannot in principle be 
disassociated, nor can a priority be given, in any strong disjunctive sense, either to 
teacher-centred or to student-centred education as an educational quality-assurance 
criterion precisely because in the teaching and learning relationship the teacher‘s 
objective is directly related to and subordinated towards the learner‘s learning 
outcomes — but the successful achievement of those learning outcomes by the 
student, and the level of achievement possible, is entirely dependent, in reality, on 
the co-operation of both teacher and learner and on each of their respective 
capabilities, skills, creative abilities and willingness to actively take up their 
respective responsibilities.58 
 
IV 
SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SOME EVALUATIONS 
 
The causal linkage involved in any teaching and learning relationship is a complex 
one, and this is why the relation between teaching and learning is not as cut and 
dried as assumed and promoted by the ‗Standard Thesis‘ on teaching and learning. 
A fortiori, analyzing teaching and learning under the assumption that they are, or 
ought to be best understood as discrete activities cannot in principle enable proper 
reflection or adequate appraisal of the teaching and learning activities. The analysis 
and model of principal and secondary-instrumental causality is better suited to 
explaining the realties of teaching and learning, paying due attention to the point of 
contact wherein the teacher is instrumentally involved with the learner in the 
process of the passing-on of educational content. This passing-on of knowledge is one 
function of education and one purpose of education, and it is a function that, as 
McCauley and the followers of St Thomas stress, both requires and invites active 
learning through imitation on part of the student. Indeed, this is why the power of 
‗imitation‘ (mimesis, Greek) in knowledge has always been — ever since Plato 
spotted it — and will always be, into the foreseeable future, an issue of concern, if 
not of censorship, however contentious the latter may be, for ‗luminaries‘, ‗leaders‘, 
and ‗people-in-charge‘ of ‗educating‘ others. 
Another function and purpose of education, however, is the exercise of 
‗discrimination‘. Education requires and invites not only active learning through 
imitation but also active learning through discrimination. Where does this occur in 
the process outlined above? 
 
58 This seems to be overlooked by the promoters of the Bologna Agreement and Bologna Process, 
but it is assumed that a student-centred approach tailored to ‗learning outcomes‘ is a criterion of 
quality-assurance of a learning process for students in education (see, supra, n. 4). Teaching, of 
course, is, in principle, sub-ordinate to a learner‘s learning, hence, in this regard identifying learning 
outcomes should make the responsibilities for both teacher and learner more visible. That is to be 
welcomed. It does not follow, however, that identifying learning outcomes and making such 
responsibilities more visible leads automatically to an improvement in the quality of teaching or 
learning among teachers and learners. Many more factors need to be taken into consideration in this 
complex network of co-operative principal and instrumental-causality that is operative in the reality 
of teaching and learning. 
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The teacher exercises powers of discrimination in the ‗selection‘ of the 
material, over which the learner has little control. Such discrimination and 
responsibility, therefore, is exercised to a greater extent on the part of the teacher 
(and of the institution, e.g. syllabi, courses designed and designated learning-
outcomes, library resources etc.). Can the learner select the material?  No, because 
in this process the subject-matter or body of knowledge is there (first) to be known 
by the teacher qua presenter (educator) and then to be discovered by the learner.59 
Given that this is the way knowledge is passed-on in a teaching–learning process, 
the question arises: is there not a real possibility that the knowledge-content that is 
being passed on becomes a commodity, a consumer–customisable product which is 
transmitted via those in charge of educational systems and institutions, who also 
select such knowledge-content (and appoint the educators), to re-produce and 
sustain those that are already in dominant positions of power and in charge of 
education?60  Power relations exist in the real world and have a very significant 
impact and influence on the selection of the content of education provided.61 This 
question, therefore, raises the wider social question regarding the role of ideology in 
education and the philosophical debate about which ‗values‘ and ‗whose values‘ that 
are being transmitted in and through educational establishments. Thus it would 
appear to be the case that the entire process of education is, at bottom, essentially a 
normative activity in that, as Frankena succinctly points out, ‗it is concerned to 
propose ends or values for education to promote, principles for it to follow, 
excellences for it to foster, or methods, contents, programmes etc. for it to adopt or 
employ in general or specific situations.‘62  If this is the case, however, this raises the 
question, can the kind of knowledge sought that does not re-enforce established 
and dominant historical and social values in a given society, but which is critical of 
accepted values of a society, be taught in a given educational establishment? Where 
 
59Of course, a pupil could discover some item of knowledge, or relevant book or perspective on the 
topic that the teacher has not encountered and draws this to the attention of the teacher. In such 
cases, one is reminded of one of Nietzsche‘s famous aphorisms: ‗one repays a teacher badly by 
remaining a pupil‘. This should not detract from seeing the generosity of the acts of any teacher in 
any teaching–learning relationship, but this will be difficult to see if one chooses not to take (a priori) 
such acts for what they are. See, supra, n. 16. 
60 This has been one of the cental bones of contentions of Marxist inspired critiques of education 
associated with such figures as Paulo Friere‘s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Penguin, 1970); Ivan Illich 
Deschooling Society (Penguin, 1973);  Michael W. Apple, Education and Power (London: Routledge, 2nd 
edn, 1995) and his Ideology and Curriculum, 3rd edn (London & New York: RoutledgeFarmer, 2004), 
and by many others.  It also plays a very significant role in the origins of so-called post-modern 
thinkers. See, for example, the previous article, in this volume, by Jones Irwin, ‗Re-Politicising 
Education — Interpreting Jean-François Lyotard‘s ‗68 Texts and The Postmodern Condition in a 
Contemporary Educational Context‘. 
61 In many respects such politics is outside of ethics and needs to be studied outside ethics; but such 
politics, nevertheless, raises ethical concerns. For a general take on these wider issues, see Raymond 
Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
62 W. K. Frankena, ‗Educational Values and Goals: Some Dispositions to be Fostered‘, Monist, 52 
(1968), 1–10. Incorporating ‗excellences to foster‘ that find their objectives and their criteria of 
success outside of educational values, aims, principles and goals, such as, for instance, successful 
business operations, therefore, will have a detrimental affect on both the provision and the quality of 
education. Thus Pring sees not only the limits of the applicability of the business model of operating 
to education (as many others argue for) but the inapplicability of that model to the advancement and 
quality-assurance of (genuine) education. See Pring‘s paper in this volume, especially Ssection V ‗The 
Aims of Education‘. 
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and how does one proceed in order to arrive at a genuine critical knowledge and 
critical understanding of such social and political conditioning, and of the ‗values‘ 
that are being transmitted in and through the educational process?  These questions 
point to a different set of issues about teaching ‗and‘ learning, and to a different set 
of questions about the ‗content‘ of knowledge because here the social-historical-
political conditions that play a determinative role in the constitution, transmission 
and transference of the knowledge-content now becomes the main ‗object‘ of focus 
and of enquiry in the examination of learning through discovery. This topic, 
however, brings us beyond the analysis of the synchronic-temporal dimension that 
exists in the teaching-learning relationship and in the direction of the diachronic-
historical depth-dimension that is also present in the teaching-learning relationship. 
Addressing this topic is outside of the parameters and scope of this paper, but it 
would invite and require both a historical and a hermeneutical approach in the 
analysis of the power relations inherent in the kind of causality and causal link that 
exists (and that is brought into existence) in the social and political reality of 
teaching and learning.63 
 
 
63 This article is a revised version of a paper that I read at the Autumn 2008 Conference of the Irish 
Philosophical Society on ‗Philosophy of Education‘ at Mary Immaculate College, University of 
Limerick. It is also based upon part of a lecture-course on the ‗Philosophy of Education‘ which I 
delivered at St Nicholas Montessori College, Ireland, Dún Laoghaire, Co. Dublin (from 2004–2008). 
I would like to thank the participants at the Conference, students at St Nicholas‘s during the years I 
taught there, and the reviewer of a draft version of this article for their very helpful remarks and 
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